

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSC-05 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03

ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 DODE-00 H-02 /067 W

----- 056335

R 090944Z AUG 76

FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1572

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USNATO BRUSSELS 483

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, BU, NATO

SUBJECT: DISTORTIONS ABOUT CSCE AND NATO

REF: A) STATE 192474; B) STATE 177231; C) SOFIA 2811 (NOTAL);

D) SOFIA 1393 (NOTAL)

1. IN COURSE OF TOUR D'HORIZON AUG 6 WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN  
MINISTER TSVETKOV (WHO HAS TAKEN OVER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR  
US FROM ZAKHARIEVA), I HIT THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. DISTORTIONS OF CSCE FINAL ACT BY ECPC DOCUMENT  
AS PER PARA 2C REF B. SINCE MFA OFFICIALS COULD TOO EASILY  
PLEAD IGNORANCE OF BERLIN "PARTY" DOCUMENT, WE HAD PREPARED  
A "NON-PAPER" WHICH I LEFT WITH TSVETKOV. HE MADE NO COMMENT  
ON SUBSTANCE, EXCEPT TO SAY GOB WELCOMES WIDE-RANGING  
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DISCUSSIONS OF CSCE OF THE KIND THAT I HAD HAD WITH

FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV LAST DECEMBER (REF C) AND WOULD, AS I HAD SUGGESTED, ARRANGE FOR ANOTHER SUCH DETAILED SESSION. HE THEN WENT ON TO MAKE COUNTER-CHARGE ON CSCE AS PER PARA 2 BELOW.

B. INEXPLICABLE REMARK OF PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV ABOUT NATO "TRYING TO STIR UP AND TO USE FOR (ITS) PURPOSES EXISTING DIFFERENCES" AMONG BALKAN COUNTRIES (REF D). I NOTED THAT BRITISH AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS MATTER AND SAID I WAS NOT "PROTESTING" OR EVEN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS BUT WAS FOR THE MOMENT ONLY INQUIRING WHAT ZHIVKOV COULD POSSIBLY HAVE MEANT. DEPENDING ON GOB REPLY WE WOULD THEN BE IN POSITION TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO NEXT. TSVETKOV TRIED TO TURN THIS ASIDE BY SAYING: "I AM UNABLE TO SAY WHAT PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV HAD IN MIND WITH THOSE SENTENCES, WHICH HAVE ATTRACTED MORE ATTENTION ABROAD THAN IN BULGARIA, AND HE DOESN'T ACCOUNT TO HIS SUBORDINATES FOR EVERYTHING HE SAYS." (TO ITALIAN AMB HE HAD SAID MFA KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE SPEECH BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN "PREPARED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND NOT THE GOVERNMENT.")

C. FOR GOOD MEASURE I ALSO MENTIONED AS "STRANGE" THAT PRIME MINISTER TODOROV, AT THE BERLIN CEMA MEETING, SHOULD HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CRITICIZE SECRETARY KISSINGER BY NAME (IN CONNECTION WITH EFFORTS OF WESTERN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES TO DEAL WITH CEMA). I WONDERED WHO COULD HAVE ADVISED HIM TO DEAL IN PERSONALITIES, SOMETHING TO WHICH BULGARIANS ARE SO SENSITIVE WHEN SHOE IS ON THE OTHER FOOT. TSVETKOV LET THAT ONE ROLL OVER HIM.

2. TSVETKOV THEN TRIED TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE BY INQUIRING ABOUT REPORTS THAT THE US CONGRESS HAD ESTABLISHED A COMMITTEE TO "CONTROL WHAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE DOING INTERNALLY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT." I SAID THIS MUST SURELY BE A MISUNDERSTANDING DUE TO SEMANTIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "CONTROL" IN ENGLISH, IN THE SENSE OF MONITORING (I.E., OBSERVING AND INTERPRETING) AND "CONTROLIRA" IN BULGARIAN WHICH

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MIGHT SUGGEST SOME EFFORT TO EXERT AUTHORITY OVER A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. USG, OF COURSE, IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN HOW OTHER GOVERNMENTS IMPLEMENT DOCUMENT THAT THEY AND US HAD SIGNED. THERE HAD BEEN SOME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES WHETHER CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WAS NEEDED; BUT IN ANY CASE THE COMMITTEE CAN "CONTROL" ONLY THE ACTIONS OF US EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND OUR CONGRESS COULD NOT POSSIBLY CONTROL

A FOREIGN GOVT.

3. I WENT ON TO RECALL THAT WHEN I HAD PRESENTED MY LETTERS TO ZHIVKOV IN APRIL 1974, I HAD REMARKED TO HIM IN THE INFORMAL CONVERSATION THAT FOLLOWED ABOUT THE TENDENCY OF OUR CONGRESS TO PLAY AN INCREASING ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND INDEED ON ITS GROWING ASCENDANCY OVER THE EXECUTIVE. THIS WAS A PROBLEM OF SOME IMPORTANCE FOR OUR DIPLOMACY BECAUSE IT NOW HAS TO TAKE CONGRESSIONAL OPINION INTO ACCOUNT EVEN MORE THAN BEFORE; TO WHICH ZHIVKOV HAD REPLIED THAT HOW WE MANAGE OUR GOVERNMENT WAS OF NO CONCERN TO HIM. I ASSUMED, I SAID, THAT TSVETKOV DID NOT INTEND TO DEPART FROM THAT POSITION AND WAS NOT COMMENTING ON HOW THE USG ORGANIZES ITSELF INTERNALLY TO DEAL WITH CERTAIN PROBLEMS.

4. TSVETKOV SAID THIS EXCHANGE HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL; HE APPRECIATED THAT OUR COMMENTS HAD BEEN IN SPIRIT OF SEEKING TO AVOID IRRITANTS IN OUR RELATIONS; AND TRUSTED THAT HIS INQUIRY ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUT SOLELY AS DUE TO DESIRE TO SMOOTH RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND BULGARIA.

5. TSVETKOV ALSO MADE LENGTHY BUT BORING AND UN-REMARKABLE GENERAL COMMENTS ON HOW BULGARIA IS CONSCIENTIOUSLY IMPLEMENTING THE FINAL ACT.

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